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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Miranda warnings do not adequately protect children from waiving
their constitutional rights unwittingly during custodial interrogations be-
cause ofjuveniles' immaturity, lack of comprehension, and special status in
the justice system.
This Note considers two competing standards that have emerged from
states to determine the validity ofjuveniles' waivers of their Miranda rights.
The first and most common test considers the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding the waiver. However, this test has been criticized for its inconsis-
tent application and lack of guidance it gives to police and the courts. The
second approach employs a per se rule requiring the presence of or consulta-
tion with a competent adult-usually a parent-interested in the child's
welfare during the interrogation. Under a per se rule, juveniles' waivers are
automatically invalid unless law enforcement investigators meet certain pro-
cedural safeguards.
This Note advocates state implementation of per se rules to protect chil-
dren during custodial interrogations. Per se rules conserve judicial resources
by providing a clear analytical framework for judges. In addition, per se
rules dispel uncertainty by furnishing a uniform standard practice to law
enforcement, providing incentives to law enforcement to properly Mirandize
both the juvenile and the interested adult, and protecting juveniles against
coercive police conduct. In summary, per se rules are the best and most fair
method of safeguarding juveniles' constitutional rights during custodial
interrogations.
INTRODUCTION
You do not have to make a statement and have the right to
remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in
a court of law. You have the right to consult an attorney before
interrogation and to have an attorney present at the time of the
interrogation. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be ap-
pointed for you.'
Imagine that you are a fourteen-year-old of average intelligence.
You have heard these words spoken countless times on television and
in the movies. But imagine yourself sitting alone in a barren and un-
familiar room, facing one, even two detectives. They recite these
words to you. Would you know what they actually meant? What if you
didn't understand them? Could you ask the police investigators ques-
tions? Even if you did, would you know how to exercise your rights?
Would you even know what a legal right was? How susceptible would
1 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnaysis, 68
CAL. L. REv. 1134, 1144 (1980) (quoting Miranda warning employed by the Juvenile Divi-
sion of the St. Louis County Police Department in 1980).
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you be to a police officer's subtle suggestions that you wraive your
rights? 2 To whom would you want to turn for help?
Adults often waive their Miranda rights during interrogations.3
Juveniles, because of their impressionability, immaturity, and lack of
comprehension, have even greater difficulties understanding their
constitutional rights against self-incrimination and their right to coun-
sel.4 One empirical study of a large, random sample ofjuveniles ages
six to seventeen arrested on felony charges found that only about ten
percent of them chose not to waive their Miranda warnings or talk to
interrogators. 5 Legal scholars,6 as well as judges,7 have argued that
2 Psychological studies argue that juveniles, particularly those of preschool age, are
highly susceptible to adults' suggestions. See, eg., Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The
Suggestibility of Childrens MemAoy, 50 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL 419 (1999). Journalists have also
recently reported on children's susceptibility to adults' suggestions during interrogations.
See, eg., Alex Kotlowitz, The Unprotected, THE NEv Yopx.mE, Feb. 8, 1999, at 46, 48; Margaret
Talbot, The Maximum Security Adoleseen N.Y. TLmEs, Sept. 10, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 41,
88.
3 See Grisso, supra note 1, at 1152-53 (reporting results ofastudywhich show that, out
of a sample of 260 adults, only 42.3% fully understood the four Miranda arnings); Linda
Greenhouse, Crime, Punishment and the Passions of Miranda, N.Y. TLmEs, Apr. 16, 2000, § 4
(Page the Nation), at 1 (reporting that eighty to ninety percent of adult suspects w,'aive
their Miranda rights). For a fascinating journalistic account of the psychological forces
affecting police and suspects during a custodial interrogation, see D,\\D Si,%o.V, HOMICIDE:
A YEAR ON THE KILLING STms 204-20 (1991), which describes interrogation techniques
that Baltimore homicide detectives use to convince suspects to waive their Miranda rights.
4 See Grisso, supra note 1, at 1153-54 (reporting that only 20.9% ofjuveniles fully
understood their Miranda warnings, and that juveniles were more than twice as likely ,as
adults to not understand one or more waniings); see also Robert E. ShepherdJr. & Barbara
A. Zaremba, Juvenileustiw: When a DisabledJutenile Confesses to a Crime: Should It Be Admissi-
ble?, Ca. Just., nrmter 1995, at 31, 31-32 (revieing factors that interfere with juveniles'
comprehension of Miranda rights); in~fa notes 45-55 and accompan)ing text (discussing In
re Gau! 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
5 J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation ofJuveniles: An Empirical Study of
Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 LAw & Hum. BEay. 321, 327, 333-34 (1977).
Less than five percent of the juveniles under the age of fifteen chose not to aive their
rights. Id. at 337 thl.6; cf. Richard A. Lawrence, The Role of Legal Counsel infJueniles' Under-
standing of Their Rights, Juv. & FA~f. CT. J., Winter 1983-84, at 49, 52 (finding that approi-
mately twenty-five percent of juveniles did not remember or understand their Miranda
rights).
6 See; eg., Grisso, supra note 1, at 1160; Martin Levy & Stephen Skacevic, IT1at Stan-
dard Should Be Used to Determine a Valid Juvenile Waiver?, 6 PErP. L Rzv. 767, 781 (1979)
(advocating interested-adult rule); Charles H. Saylor, Comment, Interogation ofJumenies
The Right to a Parent's Presence 77 Dicx. L REv. 543, 560 (1973) (advocating presence-of-
parent rule).
7 Judge Fedoroff of the Louisiana Court of Appeals has wTitten: "I cannot fathom
how a minor, who lacks the [legal] capacity to sell, mortgage, donate or release (who could
not even contract with the lawyer whose services he waives) can be said to possess the
capacity to waive constitutional privileges and lose his freedom as a consequence." In re
Holifield, 319 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (FedoroffJ., concurring); see also Lewis
v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ind. 1972) (making a similar point), superedd ly statute as
stated in Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1988). In Lewis, the Indiana Supreme
Court noted the inconsistency and injustice of treating a minor, whom "the State deems
incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their [sic]
CORNELL LAW REV!EW
juveniles cannot fully comprehend the nature of their Miranda rights
and how to exercise them.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,8 states
have been required to notify individuals facing custodial interrogation
of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and their right
to retained-and, if indigent, appointed-counsel. 9 Miranda did not,
however, address the special status that the criminal justice system ac-
cords to juveniles.
In In re Gault,10 decided a year after Miranda, the Supreme Court
held that Miranda applied to juvenile court proceedings, but did not
extend Miranda's protections beyond hearings." Since Gault, states
have formulated two competing tests to determine the validity of a
juvenile's waiver of constitutional rights during custodial interroga-
tion. The first and most common test requires courts to consider the
totality of circumstances surrounding the waiver.12 The second ap-
proach employs a per se rule requiring the presence of or consulta-
tion with an adult-usually a parent-interested in the child's welfare.
States applying per se rules agree that "the spirit of Miranda is violated
by the giving of a warning, intended for an adult, to a child who can-
not reasonably be expected to give an informed response or appreci-
ate the consequences of his decision."'1 3 Unlike the totality of
circumstances test, a per se rule automatically invalidates a juvenile's
waiver of rights unless the police meet certain procedural safeguards.
Other approaches to testing the validity of ajuvenile's waiver of consti-
tutional rights exist as well. 14
This Note surveys the various approaches state courts have taken
to mandate a per se rule for juvenile waivers, delineates the policy
considerations for and against their continued use, and concludes
that per se rules are the best and most fair method to safeguard
own blood," as an adult "when asked to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar." Id.; see
also infra Part II.B (discussing Indiana's approach to juvenile waiver).
8 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9 Id. at 471-73.
10 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11 See id. at 55; infra note 46 and accompanying text.
12 The Supreme Court first promulgated the totality of circumstances approach in the
context of waiver of the right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(explaining that courts must determine an intelligent waiver "upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused"), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981).
13 Ann Leslie Bailey, Waiver of Miranda Rights by Juveniles: Is Parental Presence a Necessary
Safeguard, 21 J. FAM. L. 725, 731 (1983).
14 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the rebuttable presumption rule); infra Part P1.C.1
(discussing the youth rights form); infra Part IV.0.2 (discussing the proposal to videotape
interrogations of juveniles).
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juveniles' constitutional rights during custodial interrogations.' 5 Part
I, a background section, discusses the important Supreme Court deci-
sions that have influenced states'juvenile waiver rules. Part II consid-
ers the case law of several states that have promulgated per se rules.
Part Ill examines the experience of three states-Georgia, Penn-
sylvania, and Louisiana-that adopted per se rules and subsequently
abandoned them. Part IV analyzes the public policy considerations
for and against per se rules. It also considers the viability of three
alternative proposals: the rebuttable presumption rule, the youth
rights form, and the videotaping of interrogations of juveniles. This
Note argues that the "pure" per se rule provides the greatest assur-
ance that ajuvenile detainee understands his constitutional rights and
waives them voluntarily. The Note concludes with a brief discussion
of the normative and societal values underlying this legal debate.
I
JUVENILES' WAIVER OF MRANDA RIorrs:
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 6 The
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel: "the accused shall
... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."17 Until its deci-
sion in Fare v. Michael C.,18 the Supreme Court had consistently recog-
nized greater protections for juveniles under the criminal justice
system and thus applied these rights with particular care. Although
the Court has never mandated explicitly that states apply a per se rule,
several of its decisions have emphasized that ajuvenile's age and im-
maturity are paramount in determining whether a juvenile "volunta-
rily, knowingly and intelligently"19 waived his rights.20
15 Although several state legislatures have adopted statutes that require courts to ap-
ply a per se approach, see, eg., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West 2000) (excluding
any statement made to police orjuvenile court official unless parent is present and advised
of child's Miranda rights); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1624(c) (3) (A) (Supp. 1999) (codif)ing the
per se rule in In re B.M.B.) (for a discussion of In re B.ALB., see infra Part ll.E); TX. F. .
CODE ANN. § 51.09 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (makingjuvenile's waiver effective only with assis-
tance of counsel), those rules are beyond the scope of this Note.
16 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
17 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
18 442 U.S. 707 (1979). For further discussion, see iynfa Part I.C.
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
20 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55
(1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948) (plurality opinion).
2001]
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A. Haley v. Ohio and Gallegos v. Colorado
In Haley v. Ohio,2 1 the Court first recognized the special status of
juveniles in custodial interrogations. Ohio police arrested the defen-
dant, a fifteen-year-old African American, for participation in a rob-
bery and murder.22 From midnight until 5 a.m., several police officers
took turns questioning the juvenile, after which he signed a written
confession.23 Without advising the defendant of his right to coun-
sel,24 the police detained him for five days without allowing him to see
his mother or the lawyer she had hired for him.25 The trial court
determined that the defendant's confession was voluntary and admit-
ted it over his objection. 26
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Douglas,
reversed.27 The plurality disapproved of the interrogation methods
and noted that juveniles require more constitutional safeguards than
adults. Justice Douglas lamented that
[w] hat transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved.... [M] e cannot believe that a lad of
tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs
counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear,
then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the over-
powering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him.28
Although the Court relied upon several factors for its reversal, it em-
phasized the petitioner's age above all. Rejecting the state's conten-
tion that police had warned Haley of his constitutional rights prior to
confession, Justice Douglas wrote: "That assumes, however, that a boy
of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of
that advice and that on the facts of this record he had a freedom of
choice. We cannot indulge those assumptions."29 The expansive lan-
guage of Haley, which addressed the plight of all juveniles-and not
simply that of John Haley-suggests that the Court would continue to
scrutinize juvenile waivers with "special care."30
Fifteen years after Haley, Gallegos v. Colorado3' again emphasized
the need to protect juveniles from the coercive forces of interroga-
21 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 597 (plurality opinion).
23 Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
24 See id. (plurality opinion).
25 Id. (plurality opinion).
26 Id. at 599 (plurality opinion).
27 See id. at 601 (plurality opinion).
28 Id. at 599-600 (plurality opinion).
29 Id. at 601 (plurality opinion).
30 Id. at 599 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court decided Haly exclusively on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See id. (plurality opinion). The Court did not begin
applying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the states until subsequent decisions.
31 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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ion. In Gallegos, Colorado authorities picked up the fourteen-year-old
defendant, who immediately admitted to committing assault and bat-
tery.32 The victim subsequently died, and the state charged the defen-
dant with first degree murder.33 Although the defendant did not face
prolonged questioning by authorities, the state held him in custody
for five days and did not allow him to see his mother.34 The trial court
admitted the confession.3 5
The Supreme Court, in another opinion by Justice Douglas, re-
versed the conviction.3 6 Although the Court applied a totality of cir-
cumstances test,3 7 it relied heavily on Haley's rationale.M In an
extended discussion that echoed Haley, the Court explained:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have
any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessi-
ble only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is
not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the con-
sequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is
unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights.
... He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of
his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admis-
sions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of
his confession were without advice as to his rights-from someone
concerned with securing him those rights-and without the aid of
more mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predic-
ament in which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or
friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own
immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less
unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protec-
tion against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to
know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. To allow
this conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had
no constitutional rights.3 9
In seeming contrast to the tone of this discussion, however, the court
concluded Gallegos by observing:
There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except
the totality of circumstances .... The youth of the petitioner, the
long detention, the failure to send for his parents, the failure imme-
32 Id. at 49-50.
33 Id. at 50.
34 Id.
35 Id
36 Id. at 55.
7 Se id.
38 See id. at 53 (calling the age of the defendant in Hale) a "crucial factor' in that
decision).
39 Id. at 54-55.
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diately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the fail-
ure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend-all
these combine to make us conclude that the formal confession on
which this conviction may have rested was obtained in violation of
due process. 40
Thus, Gallegos can be read in two ways. Proponents of the totality of
circumstances test have emphasized that the Gallegos court explicitly
applied this test in its determination. 41 On the other hand, Gallegos
includes strong language to support a case for a per se rule.
B. Miranda v. Arizona and In re Gault
In the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions
that broadened the constitutional due process protections given to
juveniles. In Miranda v. Arizona,42 the Supreme Court required states
to notify criminal suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent
and their right to counsel prior to arrest and interrogation.4 3 Absent
these safeguards, any statement made by the defendant after his arrest
would be excluded by the trial court.4 4
A year later, in In re Gault,45 the Court held that juvenile courts
must follow procedural due process safeguards in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, including notifying the child of his right to counsel and his
right against self-incrimination. 46 Arizona officials took custody of
Gerald Gault, a fifteen-year-old, for making a lewd phone call.47 At
the delinquency proceeding, the court failed to swear any witnesses,
make a transcript or record of the proceedings, call for counsel to
represent the defendant, or require the presence of the complain-
40 ld. at 55 (citations omitted).
41 See Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-
Incrimination Privilege in the Juvenile Courts, 47 U. KAN. L. Rav. 1035, 1052 & n.148 (1999)
(arguing in favor of the totality of circumstances test).
42 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43 Id. at 479.
44 Id.
45 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
46 See id. at 55. Although the Gault Court specifically limited its holding to adjudica-
tory proceedings before ajuvenile court, see id. at 44, states have nevertheless construed the
decision to apply Miranda to preadjudicatory proceedings as well. See, e.g., In re Creek, 243
A.2d 49, 50-51 (D.C. 1968); Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817, 819-21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
Language in Gault itself suggests that ajuvenile's right against self-incrimination applies to
all proceedings: "[I] t is... clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement
or admission and the exposure which it invites." Gault, 387 U.S. at 49. Some scholars, how-
ever, have argued that the scope of Gault's holding is unclear. See, e.g., Larry E. Holtz,
Miranda in a juvenile Setting- A Child's Right to Silence, 78J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 534, 539-
40 (1987).
47 Gau/!, 387 U.S. at 4.
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ant.48 Thejuvenile court found Gault delinquent and committed him
to a state institution until his majority, or a maximum of six years.49
In reversing the state's determination that Gault's delinquency
proceedings did not violate due process,50 the Supreme Court was
critical of the rationale of parens patriae,-5 noting that "[i] t would in-
deed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were
available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of
the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception."52
Relying on its own decision in Haley, as well as recent state juvenile
cases,53 the Court concluded:
[T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applica-
ble in the case ofjuveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreci-
ate that special problems may arise with respect to iaiver of the
privilege by or on behalf of children .... The participation of
counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appel-
late tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not pre-
sent for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained,
the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was
voluntary .... .54
Although Gault unequivocally concluded that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments apply to juveniles with equal force as they do to adults,
the Supreme Court failed to construct concrete guideposts to aid
lower courts in determining the voluntariness ofjuvenile confessions.
Thus, Gault casts some uncertainty over the importance that an ac-
cused's age should have in determining the validity of a '-aiver of
rights.55
C. Fare v. Michael C.
After Gault, the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the is-
sue ofjuvenile waivers of Miranda rights until Fare v. Michael C.56 By
1979, when Michael C. was decided, the composition of the Court had
48 See id. at 5.
49 Id. at 7-8. In contrast, an adult convicted under the same state statute faced a mLd-
mum fine of fifty dollars or a maximum sentence of two months. Id. at 8-9.
50 Id. at 4.
51 See id. at 16-28 (highlighting the disparity between the rhetoric and the realities of
the juvenile court system and conduding that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court").
52 Id. at 47.
53 See id. at 52-54 (discussing In 7e Gregory I., 224 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1966), and In re
Carlo, 225 A.2d 110 (NJ. 1966)).
54 Id. at 55.
55 See Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation of CQildren and State Constitutions: 7y Not
Videotape the AITV Generation?, 26 U. Tot- L R-v. 901, 905 (1995) ("Gaull serves as a basis
for both the current totality test, as well as subsequent state per se rules.").
56 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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changed dramatically. Only three members of the Miranda and Gault
majorities-Justices Stewart, White, and Brennan-still sat on the
Court.
In Michael C., authorities interrogated the sixteen-year-old defen-
dant as a murder suspect.57 After the police gave him his Miranda
warnings, the defendant asked to see his probation officer. 58 The po-
lice refused this request but reiterated that he had a right to consult
an attorney.59 Subsequently, the defendant made incriminating state-
ments to the police.60 Relying on its decision in People v. Burton,61 the
California Supreme Court held that the confession was a per se viola-
tion of Miranda, because the defendant's request to see his probation
officer was an exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege.6 2
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the juvenile defen-
dant's request to see his probation officer was not tantamount to a
request to speak to an attorney and was thus an ineffective exercise of
his right to counsel.63 The Court stated unequivocally that the validity
of a juvenile's waiver must be determined by the totality of circum-
stances: "This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to de-
termine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of
juveniles is involved."64 The Court added that a reviewing judge must
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, in-
cluding "the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence."65
Whereas Haley, Gallegos, and Gault focused almost exclusively on
the procedural rights of the juvenile, Michael C. explicitly considered
the needs of law enforcement as well. 66 The Court noted that the
totality of circumstances test best recognized the balance of interests
judges must consider in determining the validity of waivers and al-
lowed them to separate genuine invocations of Fifth Amendment priv-
ileges from instances when the police interrogated "an experienced
older juvenile with an extensive prior record."67 Applying the totality
of circumstances test to the facts of the case, the Court determined
that the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.68
57 Id. at 710.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 711.
61 491 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1971). For further discussion, see infra Part I1A.
62 See Michael C., 442 U.S. at 714-15.
63 Id. at 719, 724 (comparing the "unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary sys-
tem" with the role of a probation officer, who is not "a trained advocate").
64 Id. at 725.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 725-26.
67 Id. at 725.
68 See id. at 726.
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In his dissent, Justice Marshall advocated a reading of Miranda
that would permit a per se assertion of Fifth Amendment rights. Rely-
ing on language in the Court's previous decisions in Hal, Gallegos,
Miranda, and Gault that emphasized the unique quandary juveniles
face during interrogation, Justice Marshall wrote: "Miranda requires
that interrogation cease whenever ajuvenile requests an adult who is
obligated to represent his interests. Such a request, in my judgment,
constitutes both an attempt to obtain advice and a general invocation
of the right to silence."69 Justice Powell also dissented, albeit on dif-
ferent grounds.7° Implicitly applying the totality of circumstances test,
he determined that the defendant did not receive an interrogation
free from coercion.71
Michael C. is the last major Supreme Court decision to address
juvenile waivers and represents the Court's implicit rejection of per se
rules. Although Michael C. did not address the role of parents explic-
itly, the Supreme Court cautioned that Miranda was based on the "piv-
otal role" attorneys play in counseling the accused in custody. Thus,
the Court was staving off what it perceived to be an unwarranted ex-
tension of Miranda:
Such an extension would impose the burdens associated with the
rule of Miranda on thejuvenilejustice system and the police without
serving the interests that rule was designed simultaneously to pro-
tect. If it were otherwise, ajuvenile's request for almost anyone he
considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would
trigger the rigid rule of Miranda.73
At least until the Supreme Court revisits the issue of juvenile waiver,
Michael C. effectively forestalls the possibility of a federal version of the
per se rule.
D. Criticisms of the Totality of Circumstances Test
Many scholars have criticized Michael C. and the totality of cir-
cumstances approach. 74 Professor Feld, for example, acknowledges
69 Id. at 729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also added: "I do not be-
lieve a case-by-case approach provides police sufficient guidance, or affords juveniles ade-
quate protection." Id. at 731 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 732-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 734 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 722.
73 Id. at 723.
74 See, e.g., Barry C Feld, CDiminalizingJuvenileJustice: Rules of Procedure for theJuvenile
Court 69 MwNN. L REv. 141, 173-77 (1984); Schlam, supra note 55, at 912-14; Penelope
Alysse Brobst, Note, The Court Giveth and the Court Talhth Away: State %. Fernandez-Re-
turning Louisiana's Children to an Adult Standard, 60 L.# L REv. 605, 621-25 (2000);Juruik
Confessions: 11hether State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally Permissible Confessions, 67 J. CrUM,.
L & CRmNOLOGY 195, 202 (1976) (hereinafter Juvenile Confessions]. But cf AnthonyJ.
Krastek, Comment, The Judicial Response toJuenile Confessions: An Examination of the Per Se
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that courts have established relevant factors for identifying knowing
and voluntary waivers75 but decries the fact that they have not given
any particular factor controlling weight,76 thus leaving the determina-
tion to the "unfettered discretion of the trial court."77 The absence of
any clear rules arguably places a child in the same situation as an
adult.78 There is no assurance, for example, that courts will consider
the empirical evidence that juveniles do not comprehend Miranda
Rule, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 659, 685 (1979) (advocating a totality of circumstances approach, but
one that is liberally applied to approach the rigor of a strict scrutiny standard of review);
Elizabeth J. Maykut, Comment, Who Is Advising Our Children: Custodial Interrogation of
Juveniles in Florida, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1345, 1372-74 (1994) (advocating Massachusetts's
two-tiered rule); Meyer, supra note 41, at 1069-75 (enumerating the advantages of the total-
ity of circumstances rule).
75 Connpare West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968) (nine factor test),
with State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302, 303 (N.H. 1985) (fifteen factor test), and State v.
Young, 552 P.2d 905 (Kan. 1976) (five factor test).
76 Feld, supra note 74, at 173. For an illustration of how a defendant's immaturity can
be discounted when ajudge considers a myriad of factors, see In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302,
1306 (Kan. 1998). In considering the admissibility of ajuvenile's confession at a suppres-
sion hearing, the trial judge reasoned:
When I apply the factors outline[d] in [State v.] Young to this factual situa-
tion, I find the following: That the length of questioning weighs toward
admitting the statement. . . , as it appears it was approximately thirty-one
minutes in length, if you take out the time that the Detective left the room.
There certainly have been many interrogations that have lasted a matter of
hours, closer to half a day, actually, off and on, with meal breaks, et cetera,
and this is nowhere near that. [His] mental state appears to be relatively
calm. Although he was described as tearful or crying as he left the school,
that was apparently a situation that corrected itself upon getting into the
Detective's car. I'm more impressed, however, with [his] comment that he
would simply do his homework while waiting for paperwork to be
processed, rather than being described as tearful or overwrought. There is
no indication at this point that [he] had any hesitation with regard to
speaking to this Detective. I know nothing about [his] maturity, other than
he obviously can write and has signed the document.... On the other hand,
he is ten years old-or was ten years old at the time. I find significant that the
Detective did, indeed, attempt to reach [his] mother and that apparently
he only took the action of picking [him] up at school when it appeared
[he] was going to be leaving the jurisdiction of the Court. The total circum-
stances would indicate that this is a voluntary statement. If, after hearing
the statement, I see anything or hear anything in there to indicate other-
wise, on my own I would exclude it. At this time it comes in. It's in.
Id. (emphasis added). This excerpt demonstrates how easily ajudge could-intentionally
or unintentionally-downplay the defendant's age when considering other factors. On re-
view, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the admission of the confession, arguing, inter
alia, that the trial court improperly weighed certain factors and did not make any findings
for other factors. See id. at 1307-10 ("[The defendant's] age.., seems not to have been
considered material to the trial court's other findings.").
77 Feld, supra note 74, at 173 (footnote omitted); see also Grisso, supra note 1, at 1138
n.24 (concluding, after surveying relevant juvenile waiver decisions between 1948 and
1979, that no single variable was determinative in courts' rulings on the validity of waivers);
Schlam, supra note 55, at 913 ("Inconsistent applications of the totality test., can be
attributed to the lack of any criteria indicating the weight a court should give to the various
circumstances surrounding a custodial interrogation." (footnote omitted)).
78 Juvenile Confessions, supra note 74, at 202.
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warnings as well as adults.79 Indeed, one major shortcoming of the
totality of circumstances test is that a judge can emphasize or down-
play any factor she wishes, if indeed she articulates any factors at all.
Without some aid to assist juveniles in comprehending their constitu-
tional rights, the recitation of Miranda warnings threatens to be
hollow and ritualistic.80
From a more practical perspective, the totality of circumstances
test creates uncertainty and speculation among law enforcement offi-
cials about whether ajuvenile's statements may be admissible at trial.81
Additionally, a totality of circumstances approach increases the likeli-
hood of inconsistent rulings, even on the same record. 82
Finally, the totality of circumstances test protects ajuvenile's con-
stitutional rights only in retrospect. One astute commentator has ob-
served that the totality approach "only protects the juvenile afterhe or
she has confessed to the police; it does nothing to help the juvenile
make the decision confronting him or her in the interrogation
room."8 3 The per se rule, then, embodies a value judgment that the
justice system should protectjuveniles prospectively, before any consti-
tutional violations might occur, rather than leaving such protections
to post hoc judicial review.
II
STATES' PER SE RuLES TO DErERmfmE VALm
JUVENILE WArVES
To date, most states have followed Michael C. and applied a total-
ity of circumstances test to judicial assessments ofjuvenile waiver.8 4 A
minority of states, however, have instituted rules, either through the
courts or the legislature, that requirejuveniles have the opportunity to
consult with a parent, guardian, attorney, or other "interested
adult." 85
79 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. Indeed, at least one state court has
acknowledged the validity of these empirical studies but nevertheless proceeded to apply a
totality test. See State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 489 (La. 1998).
80 See Feld, supra note 74, at 173-75.
81 See Maykut, supra note 74, at 1373.
82 See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
83 Maykut, supra note 74, at 1372.
84 For a recent survey of states that employ the totality approach, see Mcyer, supra
note 41, at 1072 n.299 (listing thirty-six states following the totality test). The Supreme
Court has extended constitutional protections to state criminal proceedings via the Four-
teenth Amendment. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (extending
Sixth Amendment protection to states' custodial proceedings); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 8 (1964) (applying Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to state criminal
prosecutions); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (applying Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to state criminal proceedings).
85 See Brobst, supra note 74, at 614 n.81 (noting that at least thirteen states have
adopted the per se approach, including Colorado, Connecticut, Haaii, Indiana, Ioma,
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State courts may, of course, accord greater liberties to their citi-
zens under state constitutions, so long as state courts provide a clear
statement that their decisions rest on state law and not federal law. 86
Several state courts have echoed the criticisms of the totality of cir-
cumstances approach already discussed and promulgated per se ap-
proaches.8 7 Other states, such as Massachusetts and Kansas, have
applied different rules, depending on the juvenile's age, This section
discusses the case law in five states: California, Indiana, Vermont, Mas-
sachusetts, and Kansas.88
A. California
California instituted the earliest precursor to the modem version
of the per se rule. In People v. Burton,8 9 decided in 1971, the Supreme
Court of California held that ajuvenile's request to see a parent dur-
ing an interrogation was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.90 Police interrogated the defendant, sixteen-year-old Bozzie
Bryant Burton III, on charges of assault and murder, refusing his re-
peated requests to see his parents.91 The defendant subsequently con-
fessed to the crimes. 92 Relying on state precedent and Miranda, the
California Supreme Court reasoned that "' [t] o strictly limit the man-
ner in which a suspect may assert the privilege, or to demand that it be
invoked with unmistakable clarity... would subvert Miranda's prophy-
lactic intent."'93 The court continued: "It is fatuous to assume that a
minor in custody will be in a position to call an attorney for assistance
and it is unrealistic to attribute no significance to his call for help
from the only person to whom he normally looks-a parent or guard-
ian."94 Because the police did not stop the interrogation after the
Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and
West Virginia).
86 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-42 (1983) (delineating independent and
adequate state grounds doctrine); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)
(same); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1875) (same); Schiam,
supra note 55, at 930-33 (listing several examples of state courts granting greater protection
to their citizens than mandated by the federal Constitution).
87 In addition, several state legislatures have written statutes that adopt per se rules.
This approach is beyond the scope of this Note, which explores onlyjudicial responses. See
supra note 15.
88 This discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of various states' ap-
proaches to per se rules. The states discussed, however, are representative of various states'
approaches.
89 491 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1971).
90 Id. at 798.
91 Id. at 794-96.
92 See id. at 795.
93 Id. at 797 (quoting People v. Randall, 464 P.2d 114, 118 (Cal. 1970)),
94 Id. at 797-98.
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defendant asked to see his parents, the court reversed the defendant's
conviction.95
Although Burton does not mandate a per se rule, it represents a
broad conception of Miranda that the Supreme Court rejected in
Michael C.96 The Burton court also held that, during custodial interro-
gation, a juvenile's request to see his parents "must, in the absence of
evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed to indicate that
the minor suspect desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege."97
Thus, Burton can fairly be read as a predecessor to the so-called rebut-
table presumption rule, much like the one that Massachusetts has
adopted.98 Under that approach, the absence of an interested adult
during a juvenile's interrogation creates a rebuttable presumption
that any incriminating statements made are per se excludable.
B. Indiana
Indiana's per se rule was one of the earliest to incorporate the
idea of an interested adult and served as a model for other states
adopting similar rules. In Lewis v. State,99 officers took a seventeen-
year-old to the police station and questioned him about a murder and
robbery.100 After waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant made in-
criminating statements. 10 1 The police began taking a witten state-
ment from the defendant but stopped when the defendant said he
wanted to speak to an attorney. 10 2 The police had attempted to con-
tact the defendant's mother when they took him into custody, but she
did not arrive at the police station until after the defendant had al-
ready confessed.' 03 The State introduced the confession at trial, and
the jury convicted the defendant of murder.10 4
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, remanded for a new
trial, and mandated a per se rule. The court noted that authorities
"enter into an area of doubt and confusion" when they try to deter-
mine whether or not a child has waived his Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights.10 5 Lamenting the lack of judicial guidelines for
95 Id. at 798.
96 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979). Indeed, the Supreme Court of
California had relied on Burton to hold that ajuvenile defendant's request to see his proba-
tion officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Sezn reMichael C, 579
P.2d 7, 9-10 (Cal. 1978), rev'd sub no. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
97 Burton, 491 P.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
98 See infra Part II.D.
99 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972).
100 Id. at 139.
101 Id. at 139-40.
102 I& at 140.
103 See id. at 139-40.
104 See i&.
'05 1d. at 141.
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authorities, the court added that police must speculate about whether
a judge will consider their procedures for treating juvenile waivers
constitutionally adequate. 0 6 Such second-guessing by law enforce-
ment, the court continued, "is harmful to the system of criminal jus-
tice." 0 7 The court concluded that there must be "[c]learly defined
procedures" to encourage efficient enforcement of laws and to pro-
tect the constitutional lights of the accused.' 08 The Lewis court there-
fore promulgated a per se rule for determining juvenile waivers:
We hold ... that a juvenile's statement or confession cannot be
used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and
his parents or guardian were informed of his rights to an attorney,
and to remain silent. Furthermore, the child must be given an op-
portunity to consult with his parents, guardian or an attorney repre-
senting the juvenile as to whether or not he wishes to waive those
rights.... Having a familiar and friendly influence present at the
time the juvenile is required to waive or assert his fundamental
rights assures at least some equalization of the pressures borne by a
juvenile and an adult in the same situation.10 9
Such a per se rule is but another "special precaution[ ]" the law
should accord to juveniles, following a "long termed tradition" of simi-
lar safeguards.' 10 The rule in Lewis was later codified by state
statute."'
C. Vermont
The Supreme Court of Vermont relied on the reasoning in Lewis
to initiate its own per se rule for juvenile custodial interrogations. 112
Although the Supreme Court had decided Michael C. after the Indiana
Supreme Court decided Lewis, the Vermont court explicitly anchored
In re E.T.C. on state law and the state constitution."1 Police interro-
gated the fourteen-year-old defendant, a resident of a group home,
about a breaking and entering incident. 1 4 The troopers read the de-
fendant his Miranda warnings and stated that he could have a custo-
dian present.115 The home's director, who was present at the
interrogation, insisted that he was the defendant's custodian and en-




109 Id. at 142.
110 Id. at 143.
III See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-5-1 to 31-32-5-7 (Michie 1997).
112 See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 93940 (Vt. 1982).
113 See id. at 939.
114 Id. at 938.
115 Id.
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lice.'16 The defendant and the director did not confer privately about
the juvenile's Miranda rights." 7 The defendant subsequently made
inculpatory statements that were later admitted at a delinquency
hearing." 8
In its reversal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that a minor
accused of a crime cannot waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
during police interrogation without a guardian or interested adult
present." 9 The court recognized "the inability of a juvenile to
choose, without advice, among alternative courses of legal action." 20
Relying heavily on the Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning in Lewis,
the Vermont court instituted a three-part, per se rule forjuvenile cus-
todial interrogations:
(1) [the juvenile] must be given the opportunity to consult with an
adult; (2) that adult must be one who is not only genuinely inter-
ested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent
from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal
guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile; and (3) the inde-
pendent interested adult must be informed and be aware of the
rights guaranteed to the juvenile.' 21
The court further suggested that ajuvenile is entitled to consult with
an interested adult "in the absence of police pressures"'2 and criti-
cized the group home director's statements to the juvenile to "'come
clean.'"123
D. Massachusetts
Massachusetts's approach to analyzing juvenile waivers presents
one of the alternatives to the totality of circumstances approach and a
per se rule. In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,124 the Supreme Judicial
Court adopted a per se rule for juveniles under fourteen years old.'2
However, for juveniles fourteen and older, a waiver's presumed inva-
lidity could be rebutted. 26 In that case, police interrogated a thir-
teen-year-old defendant in the presence of his father.'2 7 After the
116 Id. at 938-39.
117 Id. at 938.
118 Id. at 939.
119 Id. at 940.
120 Id. at 939.
121 Id. at 940 (citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 394 A.2d 461, 464 (Pa. 1978), Com-




124 449 N.E.2d 654 (Mass. 1983).
125 See id. at 657.
126 See id.
127 Id. at 655.
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police read the father the standard Miranda warnings, the father en-
couraged his son to tell the police what he knew. 128 The defendant
subsequently confessed to the theft. 29 On review, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that the police improperly obtained the boy's confes-
sion, because there was no showing that the father explained the
Miranda rights to the defendant or that the defendant understand
and subsequently waived his rights.' 30
In contrast to In reE.T.C., which anchored Vermont's per se rule
in the state's constitution, the Massachusetts court derived its per se
rule from Gault.131 After quoting language from Gault that addressed
the special status of juvenile defendants, the Supreme Judicial Court
concluded that although "the Supreme Court has not specified a pro-
cedure for informing juveniles of their right against self-incrimina-
tion, the Court has implied that some form of warning must be given
and that the presence of an informed adult, either a parent or lawyer,
to counsel the juveniles on their rights" is important in determining
whether a waiver is valid.132 The court reasoned that a per se rule
establishes an ascertainable basis for valid waiver for prosecutors and
police, 3 3 is consistent with "traditional policy which affords minors a
unique and protected status,"'134 and "prevent[s] the [Miranda] warn-
ings from becoming merely a ritualistic recitation wherein the effect
of actual comprehension by the juvenile is ignored."' 35
Despite these arguments for a per se rule, the Massachusetts
court created two tiers for its application. For the prosecution to show
that a juvenile under fourteen years old made a valid waiver, it must
show that an interested adult was present, understood the warnings,
and had the opportunity to explain to the juvenile his rights so that
the juvenile understood the significance of a waiver.136 In other
words, not only must a juvenile have the opportunity to consult with an
interested adult, but that consultation must be meaningful as well. For
juveniles fourteen and older, however, the prosecution may rebut this
presumption of invalidity if it demonstrates that the juvenile possesses
a "high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistica-
tion" to understand and waive his rights. 37 The court, however, did
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 658.
131 See id. at 655-56. The Massachusetts court also implicitly discounted the preceden-
tial value of Michael C. in its decision. Although the court cited Michael C. in a footnote, see
id. at 656 n.1, it did not discuss the impact Michael C. had in limiting Gault's scope.
132 Id. at 656.
133 See id. at 656-58.
134 Id. at 656.
135 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. 1977)).
136 Id. at 657.
137 Id.
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not explain why a two-tiered rule would be more effective than a cate-
gorical, per se rule.
E. Kansas
Like Massachusetts, Kansas does not rely exclusively on either the
per se or the totality of circumstances rule. Rather, it splits the differ-
ence, applying a per se rule to children under fourteen and a totality
of circumstances test to juveniles fourteen years and older.
In In re B.M.B.,138 a direct review of a trial court decision, the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that the trial court's admission of a ten-
year-old defendant's confession was not supported by substantial evi-
dence. 139 Following the factors outlined in State v. Young,140 the trial
court had admitted the juvenile rape suspect's incriminating state-
ments.14' The Supreme Court of Kansas criticized the trial court's de-
cision, asserting that the trial judge made findings "not supported by
the record,"142 "assigned weight to factors that should not have been
in the equation,"143 and, overall, "gave only lip service to the Young
factors." 144
After surveying the laws of other states and acknowledging empir-
ical studies, the Supreme Court of Kansas promulgated a per se rule
for juveniles under fourteen years of age, reasoning that such an ex-
clusion is consistent with the state's policy of rehabilitating
juveniles. 145 In Kansas, a juvenile under fourteen "must be given an
opportunity to consult with his or her parent, guardian, or attor-
ney."146 Unlike other states, Kansas did not explicitly require that the
adult be interested or understand the warnings. The totality of cir-
cumstances rule remained unchanged for juveniles fourteen and
older. 47
138 955 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998).
139 See id. at 1314.
140 552 P.2d 905 (Kan. 1976). The factors outlined in Youngare (1) tie age of tie
minor, (2) the length of questioning- (3) the youth's education; (4) tie youth's prior expe-
rience with the police; and (5) the youth's mental state. Id. at 910-11.
141 See In 7e B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1306.
142 Id. at 1308.
143 I&
144 I& at 1312.
145 See/i at 1312-13.
146 Id.
147 See id. at 1312. The per se rule of In re B.ALB. %s later codified by the Kansas




CRITICISMS OF PER SE RULES: STATE DECISIONS TO
OVERTURN PER SE RULES
In considering the rationales for and against per se rules, the ex-
perience of three states-Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana-are
especially valuable. All three states had judicially-created per se rules,
but each abandoned them years later. In the case of Pennsylvania, it
moved from a per se rule to a rebuttable presumption test before re-
turning to a totality of circumstances test. The experiences of these
three states show the susceptibility of any rule to the individual cases
before a court. A primary, albeit understated, motivation for state
courts to overturn their own per se rules is a fear that these rules per-
mit guilty offenders to escape punishment because of procedural
technicalities.
A. Georgia
Georgia was the first state to eliminate its own court-mandated
per se rule. Unfortunately, the state's decisions to create and elimi-
nate its per se rule are meagerly reasoned. In Freeman v. Wilcox, 148 the
Georgia Court of Appeals ostensibly promulgated a per se rule.149
Like Massachusetts in In re E. T. C., the Freeman court relied heavily on
In re Gault for its decision. 150
The police picked up the fourteen-year-old defendant for his sus-
pected role in a burglary. 51 The youth had signed a waiver of rights
and made an incriminating statement on the fifth day of detention. 1
At the delinquency hearing, the defendant testified that the police
had not informed him of his right to an attorney during question-
ing.153 The investigator had contacted the defendant's mother and
spoken to her while her son was in custody, but did not advise her of
his right to counsel.' 54 In reversing the decision to admit the state-
ment, the court highlighted this fact.155 Relying on Gault, the court
held that "[bjoth must be advised."' 56 The court implicitly relied on
Gault's emphasis on due process standards in juvenile proceedings
148 167 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969), disapproved of 6y Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922
(Ga. 1976).
149 See id. at 166-67.
150 See id. at 165-67.
151 Id. at 164.
152 See id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 165.
155 See id. at 167.
156 Id.
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and read it liberally to extend to all "'critical' stages of the criminal
process." 157
Seven years later, however, in Riley v. Stat415 8 the Supreme Court
of Georgia overruled Freeman, despite the fact that both cases shared
similar facts. 159 In Riley, authorities arrested the defendant, a fifteen-
year-old, for shooting and killing a bus driver.160 His mother was pre-
sent when the police read him his rights, but she was not advised sepa-
rately of his constitutional rights pursuant to Freeman.1 6' The
defendant confessed after the police confronted him with a cocon-
spirator's incriminating statement.162
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial judge's admission
of the confession, adding that "age alone is not determinative of
whether a person can waive his rights."1 63 Unfortunately, the court
made no attempt to distinguish Gault. Instead, it adopted the nine
factor test outlined in a Fifth Circuit case, West v. United States' and
concluded that "[t]o the extent Freeman v. Wilcox can be read to re-
quire an automatic exclusion, if the parent is not separately advised, it
is disapproved." 65 The two Georgia cases are distinguishable on the
nature of parental involvements. In Freeman, the mother was not pre-
sent during the interrogation, 166 whereas in Riliy, a parent was present
and had the opportunity to speak to the defendant.1 67 Perhaps the
Riey court felt that exclusion of the defendant's statements because of
a procedural technicality was unjust. Such reasoning violates the let-
ter and purpose of a per se rule, which does not treat defendants dif-
ferently simply because a parent is present during interrogation.
Rather, the key issue is whether the defendant understands his rights
'57 Id. at 165-66.
158 226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976). Riley marked the first time that the Georgia Supreme
Court considered Freeman.
159 See id. at 926.
160 d. at 924.
161 See id. at 925.
162 Id
163 IM at 926.
164 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968). The nine factors outlined in West are:
1) the age of the accused; 2) education of the accused; 3) knowledge of the
accused as to both the substance of the charge... and the nature of his
rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; 4) whether the accused
is held incommunicado or allowed to consult ith relatives, friends or an
attorney, 5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal
charges had been filed; 6) methods used in interrogation; 7) length of in-
terrogations; 8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give
statements on prior occasions; and 9) whether the accused has repudiated
an extra judicial statement at a later date.
Id. at 469.
165 RiPy, 226 S.E.2d at 926.
166 See Freeman, 167 S.E.2d at 167.
167 See Riey, 226 S.E.2d at 925.
20011
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and the significance of his waiver. In Riley, there is no evidence that
he did.
B. Pennsylvania
In contrast to the Georgia courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had a robust and contentious debate over the appropriateness
of its per se rule. The state originally had a totality of circumstances
rule,168 but beginning with Commonwealth v. Roane,169 the state moved
toward a per se approach. In a series of decisions, 170 Pennsylvania
adopted a per se rule "in recognition of the immaturity, lack of under-
standing, and susceptibility to influence, of youth. 171 Eventually,
Pennsylvania established a rule that no juvenile under eighteen could
waive his Miranda rights unless he was "provided an opportunity to
consult with an interested adult, who is informed of the juvenile's
rights and is interested in the welfare of the juvenile." 7 2
In 1983, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court changed its
direction. Commonwealth v. Christmas73 marked the court's retreat
from its per se rule. The facts of Christmas are significant. Authorities
arrested the defendant, who was four months from reaching eighteen,
for possession of 744 packets of heroin. 174 His extensive criminal re-
cord included seventeen prior arrests, three adjudications of delin-
quency, and commitments to two youth detention facilities. 17
Although the defendant made an incriminating statement only after
privately consulting with his father, the defendant's father-himself a
police officer-was apparently not informed of his son's constitutional
rights, in violation of Pennsylvania's per se rule. 76 The trial court
admitted the statement and convicted the defendant. 177
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld Christmas's
conviction. 178 Responding to criticisms that the per se rule effectively
shielded defendants who gave knowing and voluntary confessions, the
court shifted from a per se rule to one in which the court would pre-
168 See Commonwealth v. Moses, 287 A.2d 131, 133 (Pa. 1971).
169 329 A.2d 286, 289 (Pa. 1974) (invalidating defendant's waiver because authorities
denied mother's request to speak to defendant privately).
170 See Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797, 803 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Web-
ster, 353 A.2d 372, 379 (Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 343 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.
1975); Commonwealth v. Starkes, 335 A.2d 698, 703 (Pa. 1975).
171 Commonwealth v. Christmas, 465 A.2d 989, 991 (Pa. 1983), rjected by Common-
wealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984).
172 Williams, 475 A.2d at 1286-87.
173 465 A.2d 989 (Pa. 1983).
174 id. at 991.
175 Id. at 993.
176 See id. at 991.
177 See id. at 990-91.
178 Id. at 993.
[Vol. 86:437458
STATE COURTS' PER SE RULES
sume that a statement made without the opportunity to consult with
an interested and informed adult would be excluded.179 This pre-
sumption could be rebutted, however, "where the evidence clearly dem-
onstrates that the juvenile was in fact competent to make a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights."180 The Christmas court
reasoned that this move "affords more adequate weight to the inter-
ests of society, and ofjustice, while avoiding per se applications of the
interested and informed adult rule that serve, in an overly protective
and unreasonably paternalistic fashion," the interests of the juve-
nile.' 8 l The court expressed its concern that, when the totality of cir-
cumstances dearly indicates that the juvenile knowingly and
voluntarily made an incriminating statement, the confession should
not be excluded merely because of the per se rule.182
In a concurring opinion, Justice Larsen agreed with the major-
ity's assessment that the per se rule was "paternalistic and unnecessa-
rily protective" but argued that the new rule would "confuse and
muddle the analysis."18 3 Noting that "[t] he perse rule which today we
reject sacrifices too much of the interests of justice," he advocated a
complete return to a totality of circumstances test.'84
The compromise inherent in Christmas, however, proved short
lived. One year later, in Commonwealth v. Williams,'85 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court overturned Christmas and returned to a totality of cir-
cumstances test. Eric Williams, a seventeen-year-old accused of rob-
bery, successfully suppressed his confession because the police had
failed to advise his father of the defendant's Miranda rights prior to a
private conference.' 86 The father was, however, informed of his son's
rights after the conference ended.'8 7
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the state-
ments should have been admitted.las Writing for the court, Justice
Larsen-who had advocated returning to a totality of circumstances
test in Christmas-made good on his promise to reinstitute a totality of
circumstances test. A per se rule, Justice Larsen argued, downplayed
factors that would be relevant under the totality of circumstances
test 8 9 and "shunned the real issue of the voluntariness of a confes-




183 I. at 993 (Larsen, J., concurring).
184 IM. at 993-94 (LarsenJ., concurring).
185 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984).
186 Id. at 1285.
187 Id. at 1284.
188 Id. at 1288.
189 Id. at 1287.
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sion."190 Justice Larsen clearly disliked the rebuttable presumption
rule as well, observing that it "serves no useful analytical purpose" and
that "[t]he so-called presumption is not a presumption at all since it
merely verifies the Commonwealth's established burden of proving a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver on the part of ajuvenile."' 91
In contrast, the totality of circumstances test does not "sacrifice[ ] too
much of the interests ofjustice" and satisfies the requirements of due
process. 192
Writing separately in Williams, one justice advocated retaining the
Christmas approach while two other justices advocated a return to the
per se rule. Justice Flaherty, recognizing the special status of
juveniles, argued that the rebuttable presumption rule in Christmas
provided the necessary focus for analysis. 193 In criticizing the major-
ity's decision, he argued that the totality of circumstances test "pro-
vides an inadequate analytical framework for addressing the
suppression issue, for it accords no recognition to the need, in the
typical case, to afford the juvenile an opportunity to consult with an
interested and informed adult."'194 Given the facts of the case, Justice
Flaherty would have applied the rebuttable presumption test and al-
lowed the confession into evidence. 195
Chief Justice Nix and Justice Zappala, each of whom had joined
the Christmas majority, dissented separately. Both admitted that they
went along with Christmas's rebuttable presumption rule in order to
preserve a minimal level of protection greater than the totality of cir-
cumstances test.196 In Williams, each advocated reinstating the per se
rule. 197 Chief Justice Nix pointed out that, under Pennsylvania law,
the state has the burden of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver
of constitutional rights. 198 A return to the totality of circumstances
test, according to ChiefJustice Nix, would shift the burden to the de-
fendant to show that his confession was not knowing and intelligent.199
Notably, he cautioned that the majority's attack on the per se rule
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1287-88 (citing his own concurring opinion in Christmas, 465 A.2d at 993
(Larsen, J., concurring)).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1288-89 (FlahertyJ., concurring).
194 Id. at 1289 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
195 See id. (Flaherty, J., concurring).
196 See id. at 1290 (Nix, CJ., dissenting) ("I reluctantly joined the majority in [Christ.
mas] believing that this compromise would nevertheless be better than reverting to the
former totality standard."); id. at 1290-91 (Zappala, J., dissenting) ("I joined the majority
decision in Christmas in order to preserve the modicum of protection that the presumption
of incompetency would provide.").
197 See id. at 1290 (Nix, CJ., dissenting); id. at 1291 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 1290 n.* (Nix, CJ., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth v. Fogan, 296 A.2d 755
(Pa. 1972)).
199 Id. at 1290 (Nix, CJ., dissenting).
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"has in large measure been inspired by the heinous nature of the
crimes the juvenile is capable of committing."200 He warned, how-
ever, that "regardless of the nature of the crime, the procedure by
which we adjudicate his guilt should not ignore the impediment of
immaturity."201
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Zappala stressed the fact that a
per se rule provides an easy means of protecting juveniles' rights while
at the same time compensating for their immaturity.202 Criticizing the
lack of "readily applicable criteria" under a totality of circumstances
test, Justice Zappala argued that a per se rule "provides a definite and
easily applicable means of protecting the interests of a juvenile
suspect."203
C. Louisiana
Louisiana is the latest state to abandon a per se rule. In In re
Dino,20 4 as in Williams, the judges disagreed over which test to apply.
The majority, in a break from Louisiana law, mandated a per se test
requiring the juvenile defendant to have actual and meaningful con-
sultation with an adult fully apprised of the juvenile's rights.20 Three
dissenters would have applied the totality of circumstances test.2 06 No-
tably, however, they arrived at different conclusions about the state-
ments' admissibility.
In Dino, a thirteen-year-old defendant made incriminating state-
ments to police officers after the police gave him Miranda warnings. 207
Although the defendant's mother was present at the station house,
detectives did not ask her whether she wished to be present when they
spoke to the defendant.208 The police did not tell her that her son
had become a suspect, nor did they notify her of her son's constitu-
tional rights or give her a chance to confer with him.20 9
In suppressing the statement, the Louisiana court first noted that,
under Miranda, the state faces a heavy burden of proving that a state-
ment taken without the presence of counsel was made after a knowing
and intelligent waiver.210 Criticizing the totality of circumstances test,
200 Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Nix, CJ., dissenting).
202 See id- at 1291 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
203 Id- (Zappala, J., dissenting).
204 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), ovemdrd by State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98),
712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998).
205 See id at 594.
206 See id at 600 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 601
(Summers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207 Id. at 587-89.
208 Id. at 588.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 590.
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the court argued that "exclusive use of the... test in relation to waiv-
ers by juveniles tends to mire the courts in a morass of speculation
similar to that from which Miranda was designed to extricate them in
adult cases."' 211 The Supreme Court of Louisiana, analogizing the
case to Miranda's absolute requirement that the police give warnings
before any interrogation, created a similar requirement that juveniles
cannot waive their constitutional rights on their own.212 The court
reasoned that a per se rule requiring the assistance of an interested
adult "is indispensable to overcome the pressures of the interrogation
and to insure that the juvenile knows he is free to exercise his
rights."213
Moreover, the Dino court acknowledged that the presence of an
interested adult serves "significant subsidiary functions," including
"mitigat[ing] the dangers of untrustworthiness" and police coercion,
aiding the accused in giving a fully accurate statement, and ensuring
that the prosecution reports the statement correctly at trial.2 14 A per
se rule also ends speculation among police over whether ajuvenile's
waiver is valid.2 15 Emphasizing that "the concepts of fundamental fair-
ness embodied in . . . our [state] constitution require that juveniles
not be permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own,"2l 6 the
court held that, for juveniles under seventeen, the state must show:
"that the juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with an attor-
ney or an informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested in his
welfare before he waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination. '2 17
Three justices dissented from the Dino majority's per se rule.2 18
Chief Justice Sanders, with whom Justice Marcus agreed, feared that
requiring the presence and consultation of an interested adult "adds
one more costly burden to our already heavily burdened justice sys-
tem."2 19 ChiefJustice Sanders also expressed concern that the per se
rule raises the legal question of what is an "interested adult.1220 Con-
211 Id at 591.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 592.
214 Id.
215 Id. The court quoted with approval the reasoning in Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138,
141 (Ind. 1972), superseded by statute as stated in Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind.
1988). Dino, 359 So. 2d at 592; see also supra text accompanying note 106 (discussing the
Lewis court's treatment of this issue).
216 Dino, 359 So. 2d at 594 (footnotes omitted).
217 Id. at 599.
218 See id. at 600 (Sanders, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 601
(Summers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 Id. at 599 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220 See id. (Sanders, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sidering the totality of circumstances in this case, he would have ad-
mitted the defendant's statements. 221
Justice Summers, in a separate opinion, also applied the totality
of circumstances test. 222 However, he would have suppressed the
statements because the state had not met its "heavy burden" of prov-
ing that the defendant waived his rights.22- Thus, the two judges who
advocated the totality of circumstances test undermined its usefulness
by drawing different conclusions from the same record. Their diver-
gence demonstrates the amorphous nature of the totality of circum-
stances test.
Despite the possibility of such discrepancies, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court reversed itself and returned to a totality of circumstances
test. Twenty years after In re Dino, it decided State v. Fernandez.24 As
in Christmas and Williams, the facts of Fernandez are important. There,
police arrested and Mirandized the sixteen-year-old defendant after
an armed robbery victim positively identified him. -2 Following the
identification, the defendant immediately expressed remorse and of-
fered to show the officer the location of the victim's belongings.22 6
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that, under the per se rule of
Dino, the defendant's statements would be suppressed because he did
not have the opportunity to consult with an interested adult.- 7 The
court went on, however, to reexamine the continuing validity of Dino.
Noting that the federal system, pursuant to Fare v. Michael C.,22
applied a totality of circumstances test, the court determined that the
"Louisiana Constitution requires no more."22 A per se rule that ex-
cludes incriminating statements based solely on the defendant's age
would be a "rigid invalidation" that had "no federal or state constitu-
tional basis."230 Although the Dino majority apparently rested its deci-
sion on the Louisiana Constitution,231 the Fernandez court did not
explain why its constitutional jurisprudence had changed. Instead,
the court cited three additional reasons for returning to a totality of
circumstances approach. First, it noted that Pennsylvania's per se
rule, which the Dino court had relied upon to create a per se rule, had
221 See id. at 601 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222 See iU at 601-02 (Summers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223 Id at 601 (SummersJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998).
225 Id. at 485-86.
226 Id at 486.
227 d. at 487.
228 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
229 Fernandez, 96-2719 (La- 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d at 487.
250 Id.
231 See Dino, 359 So. 2d at 594.
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
been abandoned. 23 2 Second, the Fernandez court acknowledged that
"[t]he empirical evidence to date arguably continues to demonstrate
that 'mostjuveniles... fail to comprehend the language traditionally
employed in Miranda warnings and the concepts embodied in the
warnings,"' 233 but concluded nonetheless that the totality of circum-
stances test could accommodate the needs ofjuveniles, much like the
needs of individuals with mental deficiencies. 234 Finally, the court
made a frank acknowledgment of the "sharp shift" in public attitudes
toward juveniles in the twenty years since Dino:
[Exclusion of] an otherwise valid confession of guilt just because
the accused was a few months away from achieving nonjuvenile sta-
tus is simply too high a price to pay for the arguable benefit of more
easily administering a per se rule that neither the framers of the
Constitution nor the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure
considered necessary.235
One critic of the Fernandez decision concluded that its effect was "to
subject ljuveniles in Louisiana] to an outdated, unpredictable, discre-
tionary standard by which courts will determine their futures.123 6
As the experiences of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana
demonstrate, state courts are often motivated by the specific facts of a
case to promulgate or overturn a per se rule. These were cases in
which the defendant immediately confessed his guilt or in which the
parents were not informed of their child's Miranda rights until after
the interrogation. More specifically, a common underlying motiva-
tion in Riley, Christmas, Williams, and Fernandez was the fear that a per
se rule would suppress ajuvenile's highly probative statement and per-
haps allow a young offender to walk free on procedural grounds. As
Chief Justice Nix warned, however, "regardless of the nature of the
crime, the procedure by which we adjudicate [a juvenile suspect's]
guilt should not ignore the impediment of immaturity." 37 The un-
derlying purpose of a per se rule is not to help courts determine guilt
or innocence but to guarantee that a juvenile's waiver is truly know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary.
232 Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d at 488 (excerpting Commonwealth v.
Williams, 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984)).
233 Id. at 489 (quoting RANDY HERz ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATroRNLAS IN
JuvNiLE COURTS § 24.10(b) (1991)).
234 Id. The Fernandez court's analogy between juveniles and the mentally disabled is
inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, under which mentally disabled suspects
face an arguably more difficult burden of proof of showing lack of waiver than juveniles.
In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the Court held that the mentally disabled
defendant must show police misconduct before a court would find a Miranda waiver inva-
lid. Id. at 169-70.
235 Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d at 489.
236 Brobst, supra note 74, at 634.
237 Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283, 1290 (Pa. 1984) (Nix, CJ., dissenting).
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IV
THE CASE FOR PER SE RULES
In both the state and federal cases examined, courts have consid-
ered constitutional, policy, administrative, and even moral arguments
for and against per se rules. This part of the Note summarizes the
advantages and disadvantages of the per se rule. It will also consider
the rebuttable presumption rule and why it would prove no better
than the totality of circumstances test. Finally, the discussion turns to
alternatives to the totality of circumstances and per se approaches: the
youth rights form and the videotaping of interrogations ofjuveniles.
It concludes that states should implement a "pure" per se rule-one
without the assistance of videotaping-because it is the most protec-
tive ofjuveniles' constitutional rights. The price society must pay for a
per se approach-excluding the incriminating statements of "sophisti-
cated" juveniles-is outweighed by the assurances that per se rules
provide to the courts, prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and soci-
ety that any juvenile waiver of constitutional rights is truly the product
of an informed, free choice.
A. Disadvantages of Per Se Rules
Many states have rejected per se rules. First, a number of courts
and commentators have argued that per se rules are merely prophy-
lactic and are not mandated by either the federal or state constitu-
tions.2 s8 This is perhaps the strongest argument for proponents of
the totality of circumstances approach, yet it is not one alw-ays under-
scored. Per se rules require the presence and assistance of an inter-
ested adult to help the juvenile understand his Miranda rights, which
some have argued are only prophylactic. 39 In Michael C., the Su-
preme Court squarely rejected the California Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of Miranda that would have expanded the invocation of
Fifth Amendment privilege to a juvenile asking for his probation of-
ficer.240 For the Michael C. majority, this interpretation extended .Mi-
randa's protections too far.241 Moreover, "[m]ost courts have
238 See, eg., Fernande, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d at 487; State v. Benoit, 490
A.2d 295, 303 (N.H. 1985); Krastek, supra note 74, at 681. But ef. Saylor, supra note 6, at
550-53 (advancing the theory that a constitutional right to a parent's presence exists by
extension of Haey, Gallegos, and GauO).
239 Kg., Brief of Petitioner at 22, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
(No. 99-5525). The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, by holding that MI-
randawas a constitutional decision which Congress could not overrule by statute. Dinon,
120 S. Ct. at 2336-37.
240 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 723 (1979).
241 See id. ("Such an extension would impose the burdens associated ith the rule of
Miranda on thejuvenilejustice system and the police without serving the interests that rule
was designed simultaneously to protect.").
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consistently refused to hold that juveniles are incapable of compe-
tently waiving constitutional rights as a matter of law."242 In addition
to the Supreme Court in Fare, state courts, like those in Williams and
Fernandez, have argued that the totality of circumstances test satisfies
due process. 243
This argument, however, ignores the assertion that the per se rule
focuses the court's attention on police conduct. In contrast, a totality of
circumstances test is more likely to consider the characteristics and
behavior of the juvenile, such as the youth's criminal record and the
nature of the alleged crime. Arguably the purpose of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, however, is to protect citizens from government
action, not to consider the force of those rights in light of an individ-
ual's characteristics. 2 " The per se rule best protects juveniles against
coercive police conduct.
Even if per se rules were not constitutionally mandated at the fed-
eral level, states can protect constitutional rights to a greater extent
than the minimum level required by the federal Constitution.2 4
Moreover, simply because a judicially created rule is not constitution-
ally mandated does not mean that it is not sound policy. Consider, for
example, the hearsay doctrine in evidence law or the exclusionary rule
in criminal procedure.246
A second disadvantage of the per se rule is that it increases the
administrative burden on police to secure an interested adult's pres-
ence prior to the juvenile's interrogation. In his separate opinion in
In re Dino, Chief Justice Sanders feared that imposing an interested
adult requirement "adds one more costly burden to our already heav-
ily burdened justice system." 247 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
has also rejected the per se rule, reasoning that it "would result in
onerous financial and administrative burdens which are
unwarranted."248
242 Saylor, supra note 6, at 560.
243 See Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d at 487; Commonwealth v. Wi!-
liams, 475 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 1984).
244 SeeAkhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131-32
(1991) (arguing that the "protection of the people against self-interested government" was
"first in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights").
245 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
246 Because these two doctrines are not constitutionally mandated, howeverthey have
been the target of vocal criticism and subject to numerous judicial exceptions. In the exclu-
sionary rule context, for example, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1995), Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984), and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907.08
(1984), superseded by rule as stated in In re Search of Kitty's East, 905 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir.
1990).
247 In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 599 (La. 1978) (Sanders, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), overruled by State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d 485
(La. 1998).
248 State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985).
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This argument, however, marginalizes the fact that per se rules
dispel uncertainty among police officers over whether a confession
will later be admissible in court. While the per se rule might increase
the financial burdens on law enforcement, it minimizes the specula-
don engendered under the totality of circumstances test. The per se
rule's bright line test also conserves judicial resources and provides
courts a clear analytical framework to assess juvenile waivers.
A third disadvantage of the per se rule is that it increases the
likelihood of collateral litigation, including issues over whether the
juvenile had the opportunity to meet with an "interested adult,"
whether that consultation was truly meaningful, whether the consulta-
tion occurred in private, and whether the adult received notice of and
understood the juvenile's rights.2 49 At least one commentator has
suggested that courts already exercise vast discretion in determining
whether these requirements are met, in effect reintroducing the total-
ity of circumstances test into its determination of a valid waiver, result-
ing in the very approach the per se rule rejects. ° While this
argument has some merit, these very issues are already litigated under
the totality of circumstances test. Reviewing courts, in determining
the myriad of factors under the totality of circumstances test, must
already consider whether an adult was present and, if so, whether that
adult was interested in the child's welfare and whether any meaning-
ful consultation took place. The per se rule guides judges' review to
particular issues, rather than subjecting these questions to the vagaries
of the totality of circumstances test, under which ajudge may or may
not consider these questions at all.2'
A final disadvantage of the per se rule is that it encourages false
negatives; in other words, courts are more likely to exclude truly vol-
untary confessions simply because of procedural noncompliance.- 2
As one observer noted, "[a] per se rule has the advantage of providing
clear boundaries, but it does not take into account the individual
characteristics of the child."253 Courts applying a per se rule may not
consider other relevant factors that a totality of circumstances test ac-
counts for, including the sophistication and intelligence of the juve-
nile. This was perhaps the motivation behind states abandoning their
own per se rules and returning to a totality of circumstances test.2- 4
Critics of this result argue that society's need to solve crimes and pro-
tect the public "outweighs the exclusion of ajuvenile's confession on
249 Krastek, supra note 74, at 682-83.
250 See id. at 684 (arguing that "the specific guidelines introduced through the per se
rule have not supplanted the traditional 'totality of circumstance' test7).
251 See supra note 76.
252 Krastek, supra note 74, at 685.
253 Maykut, supra note 74, at 1374.
254 See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the basis of youth alone" and that the per se rule undervalues this
objective.255 As the conclusion will explain, this argument is essen-
tially a normative one that cannot be adequately addressed by policy
considerations alone. 25 6
B. Consideration of the Rebuttable Presumption Rule
The rebuttable presumption rule, while initially appealing, does
not solve many of the problems inherent in the totality of circum-
stances approach. On first consideration, the rebuttable presumption
rule-like the one briefly adopted by Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
Christmas2 57 and still used by Massachusetts for juveniles over thirteen
years of age25 8-offers a reasonable compromise to the debate.
Under this rule, courts would still apply a per se rule, yet the prosecu-
tion could rebut the presumption if it made a substantial showing that
the child voluntarily and knowingly waived his or her constitutional
rights. This rule has the advantage of protecting juveniles in most
instances, but does not allow the sophisticated or recidivist juvenile
who understands the Miranda warnings to escape punishment on a
procedural technicality. The rebuttable presumption approach seems
to temper the harshness of the per se approach while at the same time
acknowledge the particular needs of juveniles in custodial situations.
On further consideration, however, the rule loses much of its
luster. In most states, the prosecution already bears the heavy burden
of proving the validity of a juvenile's waiver. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in rejecting a rebuttable presumption rule, argued that
the rule "is not a presumption at all since it merely verifies the
[state's] established burden of proving a knowing, intelligent and vol-
untary waiver."2 59 Moreover, the rule reintroduces unguided discre-
tion into a judge's decisional calculus and does not eliminate the
possibility of inconsistent determinations of waiver. Finally, the fact
that ajuvenile is sophisticated or a recidivist should not preclude her
from receiving the procedural safeguards that other juveniles receive.
If she made incriminating statements after consulting with an inter-
ested adult, it bolsters the prosecution's argument that her waiver was
knowing and voluntary.
255 Bailey, supra note 13, at 730; see also Krastek, supra note 74, at 682, 684 (criticizing
the inflexibility of a per se rule).
256 See infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
257 465 A.2d 989, 992 (Pa. 1983), reected by Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283
(Pa. 1984).
258 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983). For further
discussion, see supra Part II.D.
259 Williams, 475 A.2d at 1288.
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C. Alternative Proposals to the Per Se, Rebuttable Presumption,
and Totality of Circumstances Rules
Although a full consideration of alternative proposals to the per
se, rebuttable presumption, and totality of circumstances rules are be-
yond the scope of this Note, a brief overview of two proposals-the
simplified youth form and videotaping juvenile interrogations-pro-
vides a useful counterpoint to the current discussion. Neither propo-
sal, however, should replace or supplement the per se rule.
1. Youth Rights Form
The per se rule requires an interested adult to explain the Mi-
randa warnings to the juvenile and advise her on how to exercise
them. Some state courts, while acknowledging thatjuveniles have spe-
cial difficulty fully comprehending their rights without assistance,
have instead instructed police officers to explain the Miranda wam-
ings in language understandable by juveniles.26 0 Proponents of this
approach explain that a "[y]outh [r]ights [f]orm" will increase ajuve-
nile's understanding; moreover, a completed form bolsters a police
officer's testimony with corroborating documentary evidence.0 1 Sev-
eral specifically worded proposals have been advocated by both state
courts262 and scholars.263
Notably, however, no state has mandated the use of a youth rights
form. In State v. Benoit, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court only recommended that authorities use a simplified rights
form. While failure to do so would not automatically preclude ajuve-
nile's statement, the court would create a presumption "that thejuve-
nile's explanation of his or her rights was inadequate."2 " However,
this approach raises the same questions as the rebuttable presumption
rule: If the failure to use the youth rights form only creates a presump-
260 See, eg., Inre M., 450 P.2d 296, 308 n.13 (Cal. 1969); State v. Nicholas S., 444A.2d
373, 378 (Ie. 1982); State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 304 (N.H. 1985).
261 Holtz, supra note 46, at 549.
262 See Benoi 490 A.2d at 306 app.; infra Appendix A.
263 See Holtz, supra note 46, at 553 app.; infra Appendix B. Another proposal consists
of the following simplified warning:
You don't have to talk to me at all, now or later on, it is up to you.
If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what you say,
against you.
If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to do, you can
have one free before and during questioning by me now or by anyone else
later on.
Do you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I have just told
you?
Remembering what I have just told you, do you imnt to talk to me?
A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study ofJuvenile Maker, 7 Sv DEGO L REV.
39, 40 (1970).
264 Benoi4 490 A.2d at 304.
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tion that waiver was invalid, it does not guarantee that all youths will
fully comprehend their rights. Even the New Hampshire Supreme
Court later held that the youth rights form was not necessary when the
defendant had an extensive criminal record.2 65
The youth rights form presents other problems as well. Although
the proposals presented in the appendices enjoy the advantage of of-
fering standardized language, surely the comprehension level of an
eleven-year-old is not the same as that of a fifteen-year-old. On the
other hand, requiring the police to tailor their Miranda readings to
each juvenile may be unreasonable and could lead to inconsistent ap-
plication. 266 Furthermore, a youth rights form makes the most sense
in ajuvenile justice system steeped in parens patriae.267 However, state
juvenile justice systems have become increasingly punitive,268 and po-
lice should not be expected to counsel the very juveniles they have a
possible interest in prosecuting. Finally, requiring use of a youth
rights form does not address the problem of coercion. Professor
Grisso has remarked that "even an extensive explanation would not
diminish the potentially intimidating nature of a police interrogation
to which children are particularly susceptible. '269
2. Videotaped Interrogations ofJuveniles
Another proposal, advanced by Professor Schlam, argues that, in
addition to greater judicial scrutiny of interrogations and opportuni-
ties for adult consultation, the police should systematically videotape
interrogations of juveniles.270 He suggests several advantages of this
265 See State v. Dandurant, 567 A.2d 592, 593 (N.H. 1989). There, a seventeen-year-old
defendant confessed to a robbery after receiving only the standard Miranda warnings, in
violation of Benoit Id. at 592. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held, however, that
the case did not implicate the underlying concerns of Benoit. Id. at 593. Because the de-
fendant had an extensive criminal record, the court determined that she was not disadvan-
taged by receiving only the standard Miranda warnings. See id.
266 Grisso, supra note 1, at 1162 n.102. A further potential danger arises if detectives
are required to give customized Miranda warnings to help juvenile suspects understand
their rights: a child's perception that the detective is trying to help him could induce the
child to please the adult and say what he thinks the detective wants to hear. See supra note
2; cf. Donna M. Praiss, Constitutional Protection of Confessions Made by Mentally Retarded Defend.
ants, 14 A.J.L. & MED. 431,432-33, 444 (1989) (explaining this tendency among mentally
challenged suspects).
267 At the time Benoit was decided, the New Hampshire Supreme Court explicitly reaf-
firmed the rehabilitative goals of the state's juvenile justice system. See Benoit, 490 A.2d at
299.
268 A vast literature discusses this trend. See generally Symposium, Symposium on the Fu-
ture of the Juvenile Court 88J. CpaM. L. & CpaMINoLocw 1 (1997) (discussing different "pro-
posals about how our society should deal with children who commit crimes"); see also
Talbot, supra note 2, at 44 ("In this new and far harsher view, child criminals are virtually
indistinguishable from adult criminals: they are just as capable of forming criminal intent,
just as morally responsible, just as autonomous in their actions.").
269 Grisso, supra note 1, at 1162.
270 Schlam, supra note 55, at 902, 924-35.
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practice: it avoids some of the disadvantages of the totality of circum-
stances and per se tests, gives courts "a complete picture of what actu-
ally took place during the interrogation," and "largely eliminate[s]
frivolous claims of police misconduct."2 "1 Professor Schlam notes that
a few states, notably Alaska and Minnesota, have already implemented
videotaping in other law enforcement contexts.' 2 This proposal
would work in conjunction with the current approaches to create a
"more accurate and meaningful totality test or 'interested adult' per se
rule."2 73
Videotaping interrogations would seem to assist courts in deter-
mining whether a juvenile's waiver was knowing and intelligent. If
combined with a per se rule, videotaping would mitigate some of the
disadvantages of the per se rule-judges would have a clear record of
whether an interested adult was present, whether she understood the
Miranda rights, and whether she was able to meaningfully consult with
the juvenile.
Combining a per se rule with videotaping, however, also de-
creases some of the advantages of applying a pure per se rule: vide-
otaping increases the likelihood that a judge will subsume the
importance of thejuvenile's age to other factors, increases the admin-
istrative costs of law enforcement, and increases thejudicial resources
needed to review the validity ofjuvenile waivers. More fundamentally,
the underlying principle of the per se rule is to create an irrebuttable
presumption thatjuveniles cannot validly waive their rights until they
first consult with an interested adult. Requiring courts to consider
videotaped interrogations reintroduces the idea that the surrounding
circumstances of the interrogation could negate the need for the pres-
ence of an interested adult, and it nudges courts back-however sub-
consciously-toward a totality of circumstances standard.
D. Advantages of Per Se Rules
Of all the proposals considered, a "pure" per se rule-one with-
out videotaped interrogations-best protects a juvenile's constitu-
tional rights, recognizes the precarious situation juveniles face in the
interrogation room, and decreases the burdens on police and the
courts.274 The opportunity to consult with an interested adult who
271 Id. at 925 (footnote omitted).
272 Id. at 927-29.
273 I. at 926.
274 1 express no opinion about whether states should adopt a t'o-dered per se rule
based on age, as in Massachusetts and Kansas. Further empirical research is needed. Pro-
fessor Grisso, for example, found thatjuveniles ages fifteen and older comprehend Mi-
randawarnings at a rate similar to adults. Grisso, supra note 1, at 1165. Nevertheless, Grisso




understands the child's rights is the central requirement of the rule,
This adult would usually be the juvenile's parent, but if there is evi-
dence that the parent does not understand the Miranda warnings or
might be antagonistic toward the child's interest, then another
adult-such as ajuvenile counselor or an attorney-must be available.
Notwithstanding Fare v. Michael C.,275 the per se rule is consonant
with the Court's consistent recognition of a juvenile's special needs
during the interrogation process. Numerous state court decisions
have invoked the "spirit of Gault' as a reason for instituting a per se
rule.2 76 Unlike the totality of circumstances test, the per se rule un-
equivocally treats ajuvenile's age as the touchstone for determining a
valid waiver; it can never be discounted or outweighed by other
factors.
In addition, the per se rule poses several administrative and judi-
cial advantages. First, it provides a clear analytical framework for
judges considering the validity of juvenile waivers, thereby conserving
judicial resources. Although judges must still carefully examine the
facts of each case to determine whether the police have met the re-
quirements of the per se rule, they do not have to engage in the ad
hoc balancing imposed by the totality of circumstances approach.
Second, the per se rule aids law enforcement officers in their in-
terrogation practices and helps them predict the validity of waivers.
Put another way, the per se rule deters officers and investigators from
using coercive interrogation techniques. This deterrence works in
two ways: the exclusionary effect of the per se rule gives the police an
incentive to properly Mirandize both the juvenile and the interested
adult. Moreover, Professor Feld suggests that the per se rule, by re-
quiring the presence of an adult during interrogation, provides an
additional witness to testify about the coerciveness of the interroga-
tion.277 Unlike the youth rights form,2 78 the mere presence of an in-
terested adult during interrogation reduces its coercive nature.
Third, a per se rule is less likely to result in disparate determina-
tions of the validity of a waiver. Consider the conflicting opinions
presented in each of the following cases: Fare v. Michael C.,279 In re
Dino,280 and In re B.M.B.281 In Michael C., both the majority and Jus-
275 442 U.S. 707 (1979); see supra Part I.C.
276 Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Mass. 1983) (citing several state
court opinions).
277 Feld, supra note 74, at 178; see also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948) (imply'
ing that the presence of an interested adult or attorney would have eliminated or mitigated
the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation room).
278 See supra Part IV.C.1.
279 442 U.S. 707 (1979); see supra Part I.C.
280 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), overru/ed by State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98),
712 So. 2d 485 (La. 1998); see supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
281 955 P.2d 1302 (Ran. 1998); see supra Part 1I.E.
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tice Powell's dissent applied the totality of circumstances test to the
same record but arrived at different conclusions.2 82 In Dino, two jus-
tices of the Louisiana Supreme Court wrote opinions dissenting from
the majority's promulgation of a per se rule. Although both consid-
ered the totality of circumstances, they too reached different re-
sults. 283 Finally, in In re B.M.B., the Supreme Court of Kansas
overturned the trial court's determination that ajuvenile's incriminat-
ing statements were admissible in light of the totality of circumstances,
noting that the lower court "identified the relevant factors to be con-
sidered.., but failed to consider the significance of those factors."2- 4
The problem, of course, is that the totality of circumstances approach
never indicates how much significance a particular factor should be
given. The resulting disparities, Professor Grisso observed, "under-
score the extensive discretion the [totality of circumstances approach]
vests in the courts" and "foster[ ] distrust" of it.285
Finally, the Supreme Court has refused to expand what would
qualify as an invocation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges.286
Thus, the presence and advice of an interested adult is necessary to
prevent juveniles from falling victim into a procedural trapdoor,
whereby failing to say the precise words to invoke one's constitutional
rights is tantamount to waiving them.
Although the proponents of the totality of circumstances rule im-
ply-sometimes not so subtly-that the per se rule increases the likeli-
hood that young, dangerous offenders will go free, the per se rule is
exclusionary, not outcome determinative. Authorities, for example,
may still gather enough evidence independent of the defendant's in-
criminating statement to convict the defendant or help find him
delinquent.
CONCLUSION: IRANDA REDUX?
In June 2000, the Supreme Court decided Dicderson v. United
States,28 7 a case that reaffirmed Miranda and held that a federal statute
mandating a totality of circumstances test to determine the voluntari-
ness of confessions was unconstitutional.2as Although Dickenon did
282 See Michae C, 442 U.S. at 724-28; id. at 732-34 (Powell,J., dissenting).
283 See Dino, 359 So. 2d at 598-601 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 601 (Summers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284 In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1309.
285 Grisso, supra note 1, at 1140.
286 See, eg., Michael C, 442 U.S. at 724 (rejecting claim that ajuvcnilc's request to see
his probation officer is an exercise of Fifth Amendment rights).
287 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
288 See id. at 2336. In Dizerson, the Court ruled that Congress could not statutorily
overrule Miranda with 18 U.S.C. § 3501. Id. at 2332-33. The statute profided, in relevant
part:
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not address the status of juveniles' waivers, the Court's renewed com-
mitment to Miranda bolsters the case for per se rules for juveniles.
The Court noted that a totality of circumstances test "raised a risk of
overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a risk that the Court
found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in
chief to prove guilt."28 9 Moreover, the Court recognized the ease of
administering per se rules, noting that "experience suggests that the
totality-of-the-circumstances test... is more difficult than Miranda['s
per se rule] for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts
to apply in a consistent manner."290
The central purpose of per se rules for juvenile waivers, like the
Miranda warnings themselves, is to ensure thatjuvenile defendants are
not coerced during interrogations and that they fully understand their
rights and the consequences of their decisions. Only through mean-
ingful consultation with an interested adult is there ascertainable as-
surance that the juvenile made a voluntary and knowing waiver of his
rights. 29' Not surprisingly, then, the debate over juvenile waivers res-
urrects many of the arguments made after the Warren Court handed
down Miranda v. Arizona.2 92 Back then, the law enforcement commu-
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to volun-
tariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily
made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the
jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall in-
struct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it de-
serves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confes-
sion, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the
defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at tie time of
making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or
knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such
statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant
had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of coun-
sel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of
counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of vol-
untariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), (b) (1994), declared unconstitutional by United State v. Dickerson, 120
S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
289 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335 (citation omitted).
290 Id. at 2336.
291 Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966) ("No amount of circumstantial
evidence that the person may have been aware of [the] right [to counsel] will suffice to
stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the
accused was aware of this right.").
292 See supra Part IV.A.
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nity decried the decision, arguing that it would increase the number
of guilty criminals who would go free.2 3 Far from crippling prosecu-
tions, however, Miranda has aided police officers in carrying out their
duties while at the same time avoiding charges that they violated a
defendant's constitutional rights.294 Indeed, the Didweson Court rec-
ognized that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police prac-
tice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture."
2 9 5
In contrast to the Court's recent recognition of the utility and
advantages of per se rules, the cases in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and
Louisiana overturning their per se rules are disturbing."- 6 These cases
reflect a broader trend in the courts and the juvenile justice system
toward a more punitive conception of juvenile justice.27 Professor
Dale, for example, calls this perspective a "reformulated disciplinary
parens patriae."2 98 While the Supreme Court, in cases like Michael C.,
has expressed a more authoritarian view towards children's rights, it
has failed to strengthen concomitantly their constitutional protec-
tions.299 The Court cannot treat youths on the same level as adults, as
in Michael C., yet fail to provide them with the procedural due process
requirements it stressed in Gault. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has argued that per se rules "chill the rehabilitative function of
the juvenile justice system by restricting the flexibility of action."300
Of course, if the juvenile justice system's primary goal is no longer
rehabilitative, but instead punitive, then the rationale for implement-
ing per se rules becomes more persuasive.
At bottom, two normative considerations emerge in determining
which legal standard states should choose to assess the validity ofjuve-
nile waivers. First, states must deliberate over the appropriate balance
293 Cf Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrue" Miranda, 85 CoPNzT.L L REv. 883,
894-95 (2000) (discussing negative reactions to the Miranda decision).
294 Brief for the United States at 9-10, 33-34, Dierson (No. 99-5525).
295 Dinkerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
296 See supra Part mI.
297 See generally Symposium, supra note 268 (emphasizing the differences betwcenjuve-
nile and adult offenders).
298 Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimiation of Children's Constitutional
Rights: Implications for the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HA.uuEJ. Pun. L & Pol'v 199, 222
(1992).
299 Professor Dale has observed.
[Tihejuvenilejustice system has come to mirror the Supreme Court in that
it holds a child accountable as an adult where it perceives the need to do so
(often based upon the belief that children are more mature than they used
to be), while at the same time denying full constitutional protections to
juveniles in compliance with Supreme Court mandates.
Id.
300 State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985).
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between children's constitutional rights, law enforcement's needs,
and the courts' scarce resources.301 As Professor Feld has noted:
The totality approach allows courts discretion to consider a youth's
maturity, but imposes minimal interference with police investigative
work .... Although the per se requirement greatly simplifies the
role of courts in the administration of the juvenile process, . . . it
may provide unnecessary protection for the occasional sophisticated
youth in order to afford adequate protection for the vast majority of
unsophisticated juveniles.30 2
The second concern for states is to determine the proper level of
trust in law enforcement officials to interrogate youths fairly and in
judges to determine waivers of rights competently and carefully. A
totality of circumstances test leaves greater discretion to police investi-
gators and to juvenile court judges; a per se rule, in contrast, cabins
their discretion. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court-like the
states-has straddled both sides of this issue.30 3 These two normative
considerations are difficult questions with no clear and definitive
answer.
In the meantime, however, the realities of parens patriae in the
juvenile justice system have clashed with its well-intentioned theories.
This disparity strengthens the argument for implementing a per se
rule. Per se rules best protect the constitutional rights of juveniles,
give police officers guidance on how to conduct interrogations, in-
form youths of their rights prior to any confessions, provide a frame-
work to courts on how to review confessions, prevent inconsistent
determinations on the same record, treat all juveniles equally, and af-
firm the special circumstances that juveniles face when questioned by
authorities. To be sure, a per se rule embodies value judgments about
the juvenile justice system. As this Note has demonstrated, however,
so does the totality of circumstances test.
301 See Feld, supra note 74, at 177 n.123.
302 Id.
303 Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) ("Juvenile Court history has ... demon-
strated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure."), with Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)
("There is no reason to assume that. . .juvenile courts, with their special expertise[,] ...
will be unable to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to take into account
those special concerns that are present when young persons ... are involved.").
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Date Time child taken into custody
Time this form was read
(the following is to be read and explained by the officer, and the child
shall read it before signing.)
Before I am allowed to ask you any questions, you must understand
that you have certain rights, or protections, that have been given to
you by law. These rights make sure that you will be treated fiairly. You
will not be punished for deciding to use these rights. I will read your
rights and explain them to you. You may ask questions as we go along
so that you can fully understand what your rights are. Do you under-
stand me so far? Yes __ No __.
1. You have the right to remain silent. This means that you do not
have to say or write anything. You do not have to talk to anyone or
answer any questions we ask you. You will not be punished for decid-
ing not to talk to us. Do you understand this right? Yes - No
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court. This
means that if you do say or write anything, what you say or write will be
used in a court to prove that you may have broken the law. Do you
understand this? Yes - No __.
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before any questioning. You
have the right to have the lawyer with you while you are being ques-
tioned. The lawyer will help you decide what you should do or say.
The things you say to the lawyer cannot be used in court to prove that
you may have broken the law. If you decide you want a lawyer, we will
not question you until you have been allowed to talk to the lawyer. Do
you understand this right? Yes - No.
4. If you want to talk to a lawyer and you cannot afford one, we will
get you a lawyer at no cost to you before any questioning begins. This
means that if you want a lawyer and you cannot pay for one, you still
may have one. Do you understand this right? Yes - No __.
5. You can refuse to answer any or all questions at any time. You also
can ask to have a lawyer with you at any time. This means that if you
decide, at any time during questioning, that you do not want to talk,
you may tell us to stop and you cannot be asked any more questions.
Also, if you decide you would like to talk to a lawyer at any time during
304 Benoi4 490 A.2d at 306 app.
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questioning, you will not be asked any more questions until a lawyer is
with you. Do you understand this right? Yes __ No -.
6. (In felony cases only) There is a possibility that you may not be
brought to juvenile court but instead will be treated as an adult in
criminal court. There you could go to a county jail or the State prison.
If you are treated as an adult you will have to go through the adult
criminal system, just as if you were 18 years old. If that happens, you
will not receive the protections of the juvenile justice system. Do you
understand this? Yes _ No .
7. Do you have any questions so far? Yes - No .
(This portion is now to be read by the child.) I can read and under-
stand English. Yes _ No _. I have been read and I have read my
rights as listed above. I fully understand what my rights are. I do not
want to answer any questions at this time and I would like to have a
lawyer.
Signature of child Date - . Time
Waiver of Rights
(This portion is to be read by the child.) I can read and understand
English. Yes - No _. I have been read and I have read my rights
as listed above. I fully understand what my rights are. I have been
asked if I have any questions and I do not have any. I am willing to
give up my right to silence and answer questions. I give up my right to
have a lawyer present. I do not wish to speak to a lawyer before I
answer any questions. No promises or threats or offers of deals have
been made to me to make me give up my rights. I understand that I
may change my mind at any time and say that I want my rights if I
choose. However, if I change my mind, it will not affect what I have
already done or said.
Signature of child Date Time
Signature of witness Date Time
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APPENDIX B305
YOUTH RIGHTS FORM
Youth in custody: Age: _ DOB:_.
Place: . Date:
Day of week: Time child taken into custod:
Time this form was read: ____ Official:
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) present:
[If other than parent, indicate relationship.]
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) not present.
[Check].
Unable to contact after - attempts [See last page for
[Number]
times and places of contact attempts.]; or, _ contact made,
[Check]
unwilling to attend.
[The following must be read and explained by the officer,
and, the youth (and parent. guardian, or custodian) shall
read it before signing.]
Before I am allowed to ask you any questions, you must understand
that you have certain important rights, or protections, that have been
given to you by our laws in these situations. These rights will make
sure that you will be treated fairly. You will not be punished for decid-
ing to use these rights. I will read these rights to you, and explain each
of them to you if you don't understand them, or think you may not
understand them. You may ask questions as we go along so that you
can completely understand what your rights are.
Do you understand me so far? Yes _ No
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes _ No ___
1. You have the right to remain silent or the right to talk to us about
this matter. This means that you do not have to write or say an)-
thing; not with me or anyone else, not now or later on. You will not
be punished for deciding not to talk to us.
Do you understand this right? Yes _ No
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes _ No
2. If you give up your right to remain silent. anything you say can be
and may be used against you in court. This means that if you de-
cide to talk to me or anmver questions, I can go to court and tell the
judge what you said. This also means that if you say or write any-
05 Holtz, supra note 46, at 553 app.
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thing, what you say or write can be used in a court to prove that you
may have broken the law.
Do you understand this? Yes . No _ .
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes ____. No __ .
[Note: The following provision has been included for those juris-
dictions which include the presence of a parent or interested
adult as a prerequisite to any constitutional questioning of a
juvenile.]
2a. You have the right to have your parent, guardian, or cus-
todian present here with you before we talk to you or ask
you any questions. This means that before we ask you
anything about this matter, you can, and should, call
your parents (guardian or custodian) so they can be
here with you to help you.
Do you understand this right? Yes __ . No __
3. You have a right to talk to an attorney, a lawyer, before any ques-
tioning. You have the right to have the lawyer here with you while
you are being questioned. The lawyer will help you. If you decide
that you want a lawyer, we will not question you or talk to you at all
until you speak to the lawyer.
Do you understand this right? Yes _ .No __
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes __. No _ .
4. You have the right to stop talking to us at any time. You also have
the right to ask for a lawyer to be here with you at any time. This
means that if you decide, at any time during questioning, that you
do not want to talk any more, you may tell us to stop and we will
not ask you any more questions. Also, if you decide you would like
to talk to a lawyer at any time during questioning, you will not be
asked any more questions until a lawyer is here with you and you
have talked with him.
Do you understand this right? Yes __. No __ .
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes ___. No __ .
5. If you want to talk to a lawyer and you and your family do not have
the money to pay for one, you can still have a lawyer for free before
any questioning about this matter begins.
Do you understand this right? Yes __. No __.
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes . No __
6. [For serious crimes only] There is a possibility that you may not be
brought to juvenile court, but, instead, will be treated as an adult in
an adult criminal court. If that happens, the procedures - the way
your case will be handled - will be different. However, you will still
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keep and have all the rights I have explained to you. You must also
understand that anything you may say to me by talking with me or
answering my questions could be used to decide whether you are
treated as a juvenile or as an adult. If you are to be treated as an
adult, we, or the court, will explain the adult procedures and re-
sults which could include jail or prison if you are found guilty.
Do you understand this right? Yes ___. No
Parent (Guardian or Custodian) Yes _ . No ___
7. You must always understand that if you decide to exercise or use
any or all of your rights, you will not be hurt or punished in any
way at all. These are your rights and my rights and our laws given
them to you and I in the same way.
Do you have any questions so far?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)
Yes __.No __
Yes __No
If yes (nature of question):
[The Official should make sure the following portion is read by
the youth.]
8. I can read and understand English.
I go to school. No . Yes : Present Grade
Yes __No
ATORNEY REQoUEST
After listening to my rights and reading my rights, I fully under-
stand what my rights are. At this time I would like to have a lawyer.
Signature of Youth: . I
Signature of Parent (Guardian or Custodian):
Signature of Official:
)ate _ Time __.
GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN
EXPLAIN NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP AND SOURCE OF
THE GUARDIAN'S OR CUSTODIAN'S AUTHORITY TO
"GUIDE" OR "COUNSEL" THE YOUTH IN THIS CASE, AND,
WHETHER THE GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN HAS "LEGAL
CUSTODY" OF THE YOUTH.
WAIVER
I have been read and I have read my rights as listed above. I fully
understand what my rights are. I am willing to give up my right to
remain silent. I am willing to answer questions. I give up my right
to have a lawyer present. I do not wish to speak to a lawyer before
I answer any questions. No promises or threats or special offers
have been made to me to make me give up my rights. I under-
stand that I may change my mind at any time and say that I want
2001]
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to use my rights. I also understand that if I change my mind, it
will not effect what I have already said or done.
Signature of Youth:
Signature of Parent (Guardian or Custodian):
Witness [Type or Print]:
Signature of Witness: . Telephone:
Official's Name [Type or Print]: . Date: _ .
Signature of Official: . Time: __ ....
DOCUMENTATION OF OFFICIAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT PARENT
(GuARDLAN OR CUSTODIAN) OF YOUTH
Date: . Time:
Method:
Response:
Date: . Time:
Method:
Response:
Date: . Time:
Method:
Response:
Date: . Time:
Method:
Response:
